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ABSTRACT 
 
Water for irrigation and irrigation infrastructure are both common pool resources, due to 
their low excludability and high rivalry. The well-known common pool resource di-
lemma is often the consequence. Collective action may be a way how societies can 
overcome this dilemma. First results from a three-month empirical field study in Bul-
garia are presented trying to explain how actor groups characteristics, such as lack of 
trust between community members and effective institutional settings at the local level, 
such as information asymmetry, limited sanctioning and enforcement mechanisms and 
almost no monitoring mechanisms provide conditions under which opportunistic behav-
iour dominates. The effective rules-in-use in local communities are presented. The sim-
plest example is watering crops without paying the water price. Individuals will use 
their power to maintain their opportunistic strategies and, consequently, they will not 
agree to any rule change. Moreover, the actors` attitude towards collective action is very 
pessimistic. This has a crucial impact on the evolving of credible commitment which is 
one prerequisite for collective action. The effects on water management can be severe 
and the common pool resource dilemma situation may continue. This article questions if 
there are additional influencing variables inherited from the transformation process that 
will have an impact on the institutional change and constrain the emergence of collec-
tive action solutions. The discussion is based on empirical material from Varbiza village 
in the south of Bulgaria. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Irrigation, a major water user in Bulgaria until recently, has been drastically affected by 
the political and economic changes and by the reforms in agriculture which started in 
1989. During the transition period, the amount of water used for irrigation in Bulgaria 
sharply declined. The percentage of water used for irrigation dropped to 3.2 % in 1998 
as compared with water consumption before the transition period (Bulgarian Statistical 
Yearbook, 1998). Crops, such as wheat and barley, started to replace the more intensive 
crops, such as vegetables, rise and maize that were traditionally grown in the areas with 
developed irrigation systems. At present, only 5 % of the fields with irrigation devices 
are actually irrigated (Petkov, 2000: 49). Bulgarian average rainfall is 637 mm per year, 
but the distribution varies from 450 to 1200 mm. The average annual run-off is 20.7 
billion m³, varying from nine billion in dry years to 35 billion in wet ones, excluding the 
flow in the Danube river (Executive Agency of the Environment at the Ministry of the 
Environment and Water, 2000). This shows that Bulgarian natural water resources are 
unevenly distributed over time and space, making irrigation necessary to reduce produc-
tion risk.  
 
However, irrigation can cause several water-related environmental problems and dam-
ages as can be observed all over the world (Shortle and Abler, 2001: 8-10). Large-scale 
water diversion to agriculture threatens or endangers, e.g., fish species, because their 
habitat gets degraded. A portion of the irrigation water runs off the field into ditches and 
flows back to a receiving water body. These irrigation return flows may carry dissolved 
salts as well as nutrients and pesticides into surface water or groundwater. If wells are 
not deep enough constructed, increased salinity levels in irrigation water reduce crop 
yields or damage soils so that some crops can no longer be grown. Salinization occurs 
primarily as a result of the deposition of harmful salts contained in irrigation water 
around the root zones of crops. These salts prevent the crops from absorbing needed 
water and nutrients. Another problem that occurs is waterlogging that prevents roots 
from penetrating the soil and cuts off essential nutrients. 
 
According to theory, irrigation water and infrastructure are common pool resources. 
Collective action management solutions are propagated for more sustainable resource 
use and for solving the problems in Bulgaria`s irrigation sector. 
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2 IRRIGATION WATER - A COMMON POOL RESOURCE 
Two characteristics distinguish public goods from private goods: 1) excludability that 
refers to the ability of suppliers of a good or service to exclude or limit potential benefi-
ciaries from consuming and 2) rivalry that refers to whether ore not one person`s use or 
consumption of a good or service reduces its availability to others. As shown in  
Figure 1, private goods are characterised by both high excludability and high rivalry, 
while public goods are characterised by low excludability and low rivalry (Gerrard, 
2000; Musgrave et al., 1975: 53-89). 
 
Water falls out of the sky, and flows and evaporates with no regard to any boundary. 
Water is, therefore, to a large extent non-excludable. It is, however, subject to rivalry in 
consumption and, thus, cannot be categorised as a public good. Instead, it is a common 
pool resource, meaning that there is a finite amount that must be shared in common over 
a variety of uses and over geographic areas (Dalhuisen et al., 2000). Other best exam-
ples for common pool goods are natural resources, such as forests, pastures and  
fisheries. 
 
  Excludability 
  High Low 
Low Club Goods (Toll Goods) 
Public Goods 
(Collective Goods) 
Rivalry 
High Private Goods Common Pool Goods 
 
Figure 1: Taxonomy of Goods 
Source: adapted from Ostrom et al. (1994: 7); Musgrave et al. (1975:57) 
 
Bromley (1992) has a slightly different view on that categorization. He stated that there 
is no such thing as a common property resource per se – there are only resources con-
trolled and managed as common property, state property, private property or resources 
over which no property rights have been recognized. For Bromley (1992: 14), “Irriga-
tion systems represent the essence of a common property regime. There is a well-
defined group whose membership is restricted, there is an asset to be managed (the  
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physical distribution system), there is an annual stream of benefits (the water which 
constitutes a valuable agricultural input), and there is a need for group management of 
both the capital stock and the annual flow (necessary maintenance of the system and a 
process for allocating the water among members of the group of irrigators) to make sure 
that the system continues to yield benefits to the group.” 
 
In her seminal book “Governing the Commons”, Ostrom (1990) too complains about 
the misleading understandings when definitions are not clearly made. Failure to distin-
guish between subtractability of the ‘resource units’ (water spread on one farmers`s 
field cannot be spread onto the field of someone else) and the jointness of the ‘resource 
system’ (all appropriators benefit from maintenance of an irrigation canal) leads to con-
fusion about the relationship of common pool resources to public resources (or collec-
tive resources). Typical for a common pool resource is the subtractability of the re-
source unit, which leads to the possibility of approaching the limit of the number of re-
source units produced (Ostrom, 1990: 31-32).  
 
The well-known common pool resource dilemma is often the consequence. The expres-
sion “tragedy of the commons” is used to symbolise the degradation of the environment 
to be expected whenever many individuals use commonly a scarce resource. In Hardin’s 
famous article (1968), he explains the logic behind this model illustrating it by the well-
known example of a pasture with open access to all. The essence is that each herder is 
motivated to add more and more animals because he receives the direct benefit from his 
own animals and bears only a share of the costs resulting from overgrazing. Since users 
are likely to ignore the effects of their actions on the pool when pursuing their self-
interest, it must be concluded that most of the resources bear the risk of a tragedy of the 
commons. 
 
In more recent literature, many authors like, B. McCay, (2000), M. Olson (1965), E. 
Ostrom (1990, 1992) and R. Wade (1994) criticise the approaches to solve this social 
dilemma as not sufficient. It is neither sufficient to create a system of private property 
rights, nor is it the only solution that the central government keeps control over common 
resources. Especially Ostrom contributes to an empirically valid theory of self-
organisation and self-governance with the view to the problem of common pool re-
sources (Ostrom, 1990: 12-28). All authors mentioned lead us to the understanding that 
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collective action is a way how societies can overcome this dilemma and use the resource 
in a sustainable way.  
3 FIELD WORK METHODOLOGY 
Qualitative research methods are predominant in this study. Besides interviews with 
experts in Sofia, the strategy of case studies was chosen as a useful method to answer 
the research questions (Yin, 1994: 1-17). Two kinds of case studies were conducted. 
First, 17 village case studies were made which gave an overview about the irrigation 
situation in the villages. With those case studies the main hypotheses could be roughly 
analysed. As Ostrom et al. (1994: 37) stated, theorists interested in institutional ques-
tions have to dig deeper to understand how rules combine with a physical and cultural 
world to generate particular types of situations. Therefore, as second kind of case stud-
ies four in-depth village case studies were carried out which gave much more specific 
and very detailed information.  
 
One stipulation for a valid and reliable case study data collection is triangulation. 
Triangulation means using multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1994: 90-94; Bitsch, 
2001: 120-121). This opportunity is the major strength and advantage of a case study 
strategy. In this empirical work, i.e. in both kinds of case studies, data triangulation and 
methodological triangulation was used. Data triangulation uses different data sources, 
for example: different interviewees from the same or different hierarchies or 
organisations, written or oral material, videos. Methodological triangulation means to 
use different methods in one problem field, for example: structured interviews and sur-
veys, open-ended interviews, observations direct and participant, document analysis.  
3.1 VILLAGE CASE STUDIES 
In three regions of Bulgaria differentiated by their natural conditions for soil and water 
and their farming and production structures village case studies were conducted.  
• In the Veliko Tarnowo region in the North of Bulgaria, five villages were studied. 
The North of Bulgaria is located on a higher altitude. Gravity-irrigation is almost not 
possible. Groundwater for irrigation has to be pumped over high elevation leading to 
immense energy costs, which were not charged in socialist time. Compared to the 
South of Bulgaria, the irrigation devices are much larger in size and capacity. They 
were dimensioned during socialism for the big-sized collective farms. At present, this 
Theesfeld – Constraints for Collective Action in Bulgaria’s Irrigation Sector 
8  Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA) 
Discussion Paper No.5 
leads to irrigation catchment areas including numbers of villages. The farming struc-
ture in the North, is dominated by big tenant or co-operative farms, the former 
collective farms. The production structure is less labour intensive, grain crops are 
mainly cultivated. Whether grain production increased, because the consumption of 
irrigation water declines or if the causality is the other way around is still under de-
bate among scientists (Penov, 2000: 22). Most of the technical devices are decayed 
and out of operation. The investments necessary would be too high to be covered by 
the water users themselves. External financial help would be needed.  
 
Figure 2: River Catchment Area of Bulgaria 
Source: adapted from Excecutive Agency of the Environment at the Ministry of the Envrionment and 
Water, Bulgaria (2000) 
 
• In the Pavel Banja region in the Centre of Bulgaria, the situation in four villages was 
studied. Village case studies were conducted to analyse the influence of water syndi-
cates that had been existing in that region before the Second World War. One aspect 
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of these case studies was to identify whether inherited traditions of water manage-
ment simplify the establishment of water user associations today.  
• In the Haskowo region in the South of Bulgaria, eight villages were chosen. 
To gain an overview and collect statistical data of each region, several interviews were 
carried out with experts at regional level, for example at the Irrigation System ltd. state 
firm and the Oblast Agricultural Office. In each village, a survey of one or two days was 
conducted. At first, the interviewees were selected key-persons, like the mayor, the 
managers of co-operatives, tenants or certain farmers. As second step, farmers were 
chosen by random sample and interviewed to justify the gained information. 
3.2 IN-DEPTH VILLAGE CASE STUDIES 
Proceeding from the village case studies of all three regions, the Haskowo region was 
identified for profound empirical research. By choosing this region, some variables 
modifying the individual actors`s decision for or against collective action could be ex-
cluded from the in-depth village case studies: 
• inherited tradition from former water syndicates, 
• external financial help, 
• huge irrigation catchment areas leading to a host of stakeholders, 
• tenants or co-operative farms holding the main share of land, 
• crop structure less dependent on irrigation and 
• inefficiency of pump-irrigation due to energy costs. 
This means, in the four in-depth village case studies, there are smaller irrigation catch-
ment areas with definite number of actors. This gives the opportunity to study the rela-
tions between the actors. There are some medium-sized family farms producing fruits 
and vegetables. This production is heavily dependent on the reliable provision of irriga-
tion water over time and in sufficient quantities and qualities. Collective action theory 
says that actors must highly appreciate and depend on the continuous usage of the 
common pool resource in order to invest time and money in  incremental changes in 
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operational rules to improve joint welfare (Ostrom, 1990). Parts of the irrigation infra-
structure are based on gravity-irrigation. To a large extent this could be managed by the 
water users themselves. Joint water management does not depend on external financial 
help which would add another external actor and actors relations. Concluldingly and 
based on the theoritical approaches from Chapter 2, this selection of the study site offers 
more favourable opportunities for establishing new institutional rules here discussed as 
collective action solutions. It is important to exclude distorting variables from the study 
and to limit variables which constrain collective action.  
3.2.1 Selection of the Study Site 
In the Haskowo region, two “irrigation catchment areas” were selected. These are areas 
where one water resource, for example one water dam is used to irrigate most of the 
agricultural area. Villages located at the tail-end of such irrigation system depend in 
their water consumption on the water use of the villages near the top of the system. It 
could be that the tail-end village has additional alternative water sources independent of 
the water use of the village located at the top-end position. In both irrigation catchment 
areas two villages were chosen for the in-depth case study. In each area one village was 
located directly behind the water dam (top-ender), the other village further behind, at 
the middle or tail-end of the canal- and river system.  
 
Other selection criteria were different farm structures and the state of establishing water 
user associations.  
3.2.2 Varbiza Village 
This article is based on empirical material from Varbiza village. Figure 2 shows the 
location of Varbiza in its irrigation catchment area. It is a simplified scheme showing 
the main canals and the rivers in order to draw attention to the dependent relationship of 
Varbiza village to other villages. The figure does not allow to show neither the ramified 
canal network or the share of agricultural land that could be irrigated from each water 
source.  
 
Small parts of Varbiza`s fields can be irrigated from “Kalika” river. As regards river 
irrigation water Varbiza is at third position. Figure 2 shows that the river is first used  
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from Ezerowo village and from Bodrowo village. Twice, at the “ Ezerowo water dam ” 
and at the barrage between Bodrowo and Varbiza, it has to be decided how much water 
is diverted in the river, which turns the decision of waterflow in the river into a man-
made decision. Most of the Varbiza area is irrigated from the canal R2 and its side-
canals. This canal is filled with water from Kalika river. As mentioned above, Varbiza 
is at third position using this river water. The canal R1 is passing Ezerowo, Bodrowo 
and Bjala Reka villages before reaching Varbiza. Already at Bjala Reka, R1 has run out 
of water. In Varbiza, at the tail-end position, no fields could be irrigated from this 
source. In addition, no water flows from R1 into R2 and the water storage basins ➃ and 
➄ are empty. For some parts of Varbiza`s agricultural land the alternative theoretically 
exists to irrigate from a hollow filled with water. This hollow can be filled with water 
from the small “ Galwano water dam ”. In practice, this opportunity is very unlikely to 
be realised, as fish farmers who lease the water dam refuse to let water flow. A conse-
quence in 2000 was that Varbiza’s farmers filled water tanks from Kailika river and 
transported them to their fields. 
Kailika river
Mariza river
Ezerowo
Varbiza
Bodrowo
Bjala Reka
village
water dam
water storage basin
pump station
canal
barrage
river
➀
hallow with water
➁
➃
➂
➄
R1
R2
R1
Skobolewo
Figure 3: Irrigation Catchment Area of Varbiza 
Source: own illustration 
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3.2.2 Participating Observation Combined with Qualitative Interviews 
Referring to Potter (1996: 94ff.), active participating observation combined with quali-
tative interviews form the most valuable method to gain needed information. Friedrichs 
(1990: 288-308) classifies participating observation as qualitative research method. This 
triangulation of methods is suggested by Erlandson et al. (1993: 138). They recommend 
to supplement each single information in a study with a second. However, they prefer to 
supplement one observation rather with an interview instead of a second observation. 
This combination of methods was the basis for the in-depth village case studies. Ac-
cording to Spradley (1980: 58ff.), a field study journal was written every day. Spradley 
evaluates this as the central activity during the participating observation. His precise 
explanation, which kind of information needs to be documented, was followed in this 
study.  
 
Once the researcher is accepted by the villagers it is possible to participate in many ac-
tivities that would be, otherwise, closed to outsiders. For example, in Ezerowo village I 
had the chance to participate at a village assembly which was held to set up a water user 
association. Later, I was informed that it was the first time in the village that outsiders 
had participated in such a community event. 
 
In-depth interviews with key-persons in the villages were conducted. According to the 
interviewee (mayor, co-operative manager, agrarnomist, water controller), different in-
terview guidelines were used. 
 
Twenty formal interviews with a partly standardised questionnaire were conducted in 
each village. Two thirds of the questions were open questions following an interview 
guideline which was slightly different according to the varying actors groups. During 
the beginning of the research the questionnaires were adapted three times to the situa-
tion in the field. 
 
A specific interview guideline to analyse the rules-in-use for irrigation was used to in-
terview several water users and the water controller. Ostrom et al. (1994: 12) favour this 
method: “rules are never written down, outsiders may have no idea unless they ask quite 
specific questions”.  
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Informal interviews were made in the coffee shops, in the fields or whenever meeting 
with people. 
 
Besides observations and interviews, great emphasis was put on including participatory 
research methods. The most valuable were drawing maps and group discussions. 
4 CONSTRAINTS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Recently, the government of Bulgaria released two new laws, the Bulgarian Water Law 
which was enforced in January 2000 and the Water User Association Act which was 
enforced in March 2001. Both legal acts are the result of the same motivation. The State 
wants to encourage collective action and the establishment of water user associations. 
The Water User Association Act (Article 2) outlines: “Water User Associations shall be 
voluntary organisations of natural and legal persons, which, in accordance with the in-
terests of their members and the society and through mutual assistance and co-
operation, shall perform activities related to the irrigation and drainage of agricultural 
land and the maintenance of irrigation and drainage infrastructure on a specified terri-
tory”. Since 1991, many approaches by World Bank projects have been started to set up 
water user associations (World Bank, 1999). Most of those associations were only cre-
ated formally and are not really existing. In practice, they are neither functioning nor 
even known by the farmers in the respective villages. Regardless of these formal efforts, 
little collective action in the irrigation sector can be observed in Bulgarian villages  
so far. 
 
This article questions if the theories about collective action have to be expanded to fea-
tures typical for transformation. The hypothesis is that there are influencing variables 
inherited from the transformation process which are hindering collective action. A 
complex system of interdependencies between certain variables evolve. They are 
grouped into six dimensions: 1) the formal political settings, 2) the effective institu-
tional settings and 3) the evolving local rules in use, 4) the actor groups characteristics, 
5) the resource characteristics and 6) the resource system characteristics, i.e. the infra-
structure settings. As shown in Figure 3, these dimensions modify the individual actors` 
decision for or against new institutional rules discussed here as collective action  
solution. 
In this paper, the focus is laid on two dimensions. One sub-hypothesis is that through 
the combination of the formal political settings, the effective institutional settings, the 
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local rules-in-use and the resource and resource system characteristics a milieu exists 
where opportunistic behaviour persists.  
 
Another sub-hypothesis is that the experience of the socialist time and the transforma-
tion period lead to specific actor groups characteristics and attitudes towards collective 
action.  
 
The prevailing of opportunistic behaviour and the presented actor groups features are 
inherited from the transformation process. Both can represent constraints for collective 
action in Bulgaria`s irrigation sector. 
expected benefits expected costs rule
change
> !
evaluation - influencing variables
- internal norms
- discount rate
individual actors decision
formal political settings
- land law
- tenant regulations
- water law
- law on water user associations
- subsidies for water and electricity
- state firm Irrigation System ltd.
effective institutional settings
- unclear property rights on land/ irrigation
devices
- existence of markets (choices) for: land,
water, knowledge, services, outputs,
- enforcement (control and sanctioning)
- conflict resolution mechanisms
- power structures (tenant, co-operative)
- involvement of IS ltd.
resource characteristics &
infrastructure settings
- features of the resource water
- size/ features of the resource system
- top-/ tail-end village
- gravity-/ pumped irrigation
- cropping patterns
opportunistic behaviour
- corruption
- rent seeking
- free-riding
collective action in the irrigation sector
water user association
does majority or power decide about
new institutional arrangement?
local rules-in-use
actors group
- size of group
- heterogeneity
- trust
- social connections
- mental models, history
- awareness of problem
 
Figure 4: Dimensions Influencing Collective Action 
Source: own illustration 
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5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM VARBIZA VILLAGE 
The discussion of results is based on empirical material from the in-depth village case 
study in Varbiza village. 
5.1 RULES-IN-USE IN VARBIZA VILLAGE 
This chapter is based on the following definition: “Rules provide information about the 
actions an actor ‘must’ perform (obligation), ‘must not’ perform (prohibition), or ‘may’ 
perform (permission) if the actor is to avoid the possibility of sanctions being imposed” 
(Ostrom, 1994: 38). All rules are the result of implicit or explicit efforts to achieve order 
and predictability among humans. Rules-in-use govern the patterns of interaction among 
the different actors in the system. They represent the set of rules to which participants 
would refer if asked to explain and justify their actions to fellow participants. However, 
interviewees will explain their actions to outsiders not in the same way they will explain 
them to fellow participants and, beyond that, following a rule can become a mechanical 
social habit not mentioned in an interview. To cope with these problems, the empirical 
methodology was enlarged by participant observation techniques (see triangulation, 
Chapter 3). 
 
According to Ostrom et al. (1994: 37-50), an institutional analysis relevant to field set-
ting requires the understanding of the working rules, i.e. or rules-in-use; that individuals 
use. Most formal analyses focus primarily on the structure of an action situation. This is 
indicated by the authors only as the surface structure of formal representations. The 
rules are part of the underlying structure. Ostrom et al. (1994) refer to seven broad types 
of rules operating configurally. In this paper, the irrigation situation and part of the 
rules-in-use are presented. Rules of operation and maintenance are left out, as there is 
no space for a deeper analysis in the frame of this discussion paper, although the em-
pirical material would be sufficient. In this context, the reader should, however, gain an 
understanding of the local situation to follow the chapters below.  
 
The agricultural area of Varbiza is 15 500 decars1. In 1960, almost 100 % of the agricul-
tural area was irrigated by pump-irrigation and gravity-irrigation. In 2001, less than one 
third of this area is irrigated and only with gravity-irrigation. 
                                                 
1 1 decar = 0.1 hectare 
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In Varbiza village, formally, a water user association exists. It was founded under the 
co-operative law by seven people, not living in the village. This foundation appears to 
the villagers as very non-transparent. The interviewed head of this organisation refused 
to mention the other members. Most of the villagers do not know anything either about 
the possibility to establish a water user association or about its formal existence in their 
village. The villagers speak about this association either as a private water firm or as a 
tenant who rented the canal system. The villagers know only that the water controller is 
from their village, but they have no idea who else is involved. But, as there is at least 
one connection to somebody from their village, uncertainty and uneasiness to speak 
about this topic was obvious during the study.  
5.1.1 Water Ordering 
Water users have to make an order in advance at the water controller, if they want to 
irrigate. The formal rule is that the controller collects a certain number of orders before 
he opens the barrage and fills the canal with water. Compliance with this rule varies. 
Informally no farmer can rely on receiving water in the canal if he orders. Another fact 
is that the use rights for the canal system and the water dam belong to different people. 
The case is well-known in the village that although farmers wanted to irrigate and sev-
eral even ordered water, the tenant of the water dam did not divert water into the canal 
or river. From this situation the informal rule appears that, once the canal is filled, eve-
rybody irrigates to be on the safe side, whether ordered water or not. The formal “first” 
rule that a farmer who orders water and pays in advance has the right to irrigate is not 
working in practice.  
 
If water scarcity is severe and farmers do not receive water in the canal, even so they 
ordered water, some farmers usually join and do a “rebellion”, as they call. A group of 
them goes to the barrage and opens it themselves. This action leads to brawls in most 
cases.  
If everybody is irrigating once that the canal is filled, the question arises about the exist-
ing rules-in-use regulating the withdrawal of water from the canal. This is the crucial 
point. 
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5.1.2 Appropriation Rules 
One quotation from an interview is summarising the “second” rule regulating the subse-
quence: “who is ahead of you at the canal is irrigating first, that is the law”. Ostrom 
(1990: 48) describes it as a common situation: farmers who extract water from the head 
of an irrigation system can obtain more water than farmers who are located at the tail-
end. Most of the interviewees feel the situation as chaotic. The problems of water diver-
sion between the villages are the same like in small-scale water users have in sharing 
one canal. A typical situation is that a tail-ender orders water and the canal is filled. 
Everybody ahead of him is irrigating and the tail-ender is facing water shortage al-
though he had ordered the water and might have even paid for it.  
 
The “third” rule of irrigation at one canal is specified by physical strength. Physical 
violence occurring among the users of an irrigation system is symptomatic of inade-
quate assignments of spatial or temporal slots to appropriators.  
5.1.3 Monitoring 
There is almost no monitoring system for water appropriation. This chaotic situation 
leads to the habit that farmers may guard their fields around the clock. First, farmers 
wait for the water in the canal reaching their plot, so that they can start immediately to 
irrigate, before another farmer starts to irrigate. Second, while they are irrigating they 
have to supervise it. Otherwise another farmer diverting water from a top-end position 
can start to irrigate and the farmer has not sufficient water to complete his irrigation run. 
To secure the availability of water in all villages belonging to one irrigation catchment 
area, the water storage basins are filled over night. If this is done water flows at night in 
the canal system, attracting farmers to irrigate at night. Those irrigators try to irrigate 
without payment. This “black irrigation” is usually discovered at daylight, but farmers 
try to deny. They declare that the neighbour farmers flooded their fields on purpose and 
nobody can proof the contrary. 
5.1.4 Excludability and Sanctioning 
Water users, who have not paid the water fee, can technically not be excluded from wa-
ter diversion from a canal. There is no graduated sanction mechanism, as is described by 
Ostrom (1990; 1992) in her design principles for enduring self-governing common pool 
resource institutions. Only one water controller works in the village. His plain figure 
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represents no authority. Formal sanctioning power is largely missing. Nevertheless, he 
makes use of social sanctioning measures to force people to pay the water price. He is 
shouting in front of the black water user`s door. So, everybody can hear who has not 
paid and people feel embarrassed.  
5.2 OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOUR 
Three types of opportunistic behaviour occur quite frequently in irrigation systems, be-
cause irrigation institutions create many of such opportunities. Ostrom (1992: 32-33) 
classifies them as free riding, rent-seeking and corruption with regard to irrigation. 
• Free Riding is investing time in private activities while others are investing in joint 
activities, such as canal maintenance that increases the supply of water over time to 
all users. 
• Rent-Seeking is trying to influence decisions made by donor agencies, national gov-
ernments or local irrigation associations about the location of and subsidies to irriga-
tion facilities. The person who seeks rents receives a disproportionate profit on pri-
vate activities because the value of his assets is artificially increased. A person who 
once managed to be a successive rent-seeker can very easily keep this powerful posi-
tion and expand his excessive gains (Ostrom, 1992: 54). 
• The third category of opportunistic behaviour is corruption. Transparency Interna-
tional2, a non-profit organisation, developed the Corruption Perceptions Index. One 
indicator is the country rank where among a total of 99 countries ranked, Bulgaria is 
on rank 63. The corruption perception indicator relates to perceptions of the degree 
of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and 
ranges between 10 (“highly clean”) and 0 (“highly corrupt”). In 1999, Bulgaria was 
scored 3.3. Based on these indicators available, corruption in Bulgaria is regarded to 
be high (World Bank, 2000: 103). 
Corruption in the irrigation sector, as defined by Ostrom (1992), is withholding the 
delivery of water to those entitled to it in order to receive illegal side-payments of 
money, commodities or special favours. The person who commits in corruption re-
ceives a disproportionate gain by using his power over the allocation of valued re-
sources to extract an illegal payment from someone else.  
Theesfeld – Constraints for Collective Action in Bulgaria’s Irrigation Sector 
Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA)  19 
Discussion Paper No.5 
5.3 OPPORTUNITIES FOR OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOUR IN VARBIZA VILLAGE 
To repeat one sub-hypothesis, the combination of influencing variables inherited from 
the transformation process and the local rules-in-use create a milieu where opportunis-
tic behaviour can persist. Some examples from Varbiza village confirming this hy-
pothesis are given below. The water user association in Varbiza has no honest interest to 
formulate and enforce rules to settle the conflicts and to regulate the water appropria-
tion. Bates (1988; 1995) describes this as “the social dilemma of second order”. New 
institutionalists assume that people who encounter a social dilemma would forge new 
institutions in an attempt to transcend it. Bates (1995: 44) asks the following questions: 
“Given that the new institution would make all better off, the institution itself consti-
tutes a public good. Would not the act of its provision also generate incentives to free 
ride? And why, then, would individuals, behaving rationally, be willing to pay the costs 
of its provision?” It appears that the demand for institutional solutions for collective 
dilemmas does not imply their supply. The solution itself poses collective dilemmas. To 
answer the question why, nevertheless, new institutions could evolve; credible com-
mitment is an important factor. Some insights into the provision of this are given in the 
next chapter.  
 
In Varbiza village, where the irrigation system is characterised by changing, non-
transparent and unstable rules, opportunistic behaviour can occur more easily. The lead-
ers of the association are making use of the chaos to increase their own profits. Espe-
cially with the view to these empirical findings, Bates (1995) makes a very valuable 
contribution to theoretical discussion, calling for a different analytical approach. The 
privilege of better education, access to specialised media and sources of information, or 
greater experience become decisive in environments of imperfect information, such as 
 
                                                                                                                                               
2 Transparency International (TI) is a no-profit, non-partisan organisation that works to mobilise civil 
society, business, academia and government to curb corruption. 
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Bulgaria`s rural areas. Bates’ main point is that the new institutionalists suggest that 
people create institutions in an effort to move toward the Pareto frontier. Bates (1995: 
42) argues: “The new institutionalists have been slower to acknowledge that the creation 
of economic institutions takes place not on the ‘level playing field’ of the market but 
rather within the political arena, in which some are endowed with greater power than 
others.” The new institutionalism should take into account the allocation of political 
power in societies and the impact of the political system on the structure and perform-
ance of economic institutions. When social dilemmas are solved and new rules are im-
plemented, some people benefit more than others. Indeed, some may even benefit at the 
expense of others. Bates calls for explaining these outcomes more with political than 
economic analysis. 
5.3.1 Free Riding 
The initiative described above shows that two or three farmers start an initiative and 
open the barrage themselves to divert water into the canal. Those activities always in-
volve free riding situations. Free riders do not participate in the action, but start to irri-
gate as soon as the water reaches their plots. Therefore, the water is not always reaching 
the initiators. 
 
Several opportunities for free riding occur with maintaining and operating the canal 
system. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter these circumstances are not dis-
cussed here. 
5.3.2 Rent Seeking 
Heads of associations take advantage of the information asymmetry existing between 
them and the village members. The head of the water user association in Varbiza is a 
leader of the youth organisation of the Farmer Party. Holding such a position he has 
access to various kinds of information. He participated in a World Bank course where 
he learned how water user associations can be established under the co-operative law. 
He used his power, in terms of his position, good contacts and knowledge to establish 
this water user association and to persist in this position. As maintenance work is re-
duced to a minimum, he uses his position to gain income from collecting the water fees. 
Additionally, he is a young politician who wants to make a career in his party. 
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Another example of information asymmetry manifesting power structures is the 
mayor`s access to information about new laws. As the money for the mayor`s office is 
scarce he cancelled his subscription to the official gazette. He had no information about 
the Water User Association Act enforced in March 2001. He got this information during 
the interview I did with the head of the water association where he participated. The 
mayor asked the head of this association, if he could send him this new law, so that he 
could study it. This situation illustrates the dependencies and the information asymme-
try among different actors.  
5.3.3 Corruption 
There are different opportunities to take advantage of one`s position. Bribes can be paid 
to have water in the canal in time. This is more common for larger producers with 
crops, such as paprika. Paprika is a crop that needs irrigation at a certain time that can-
not be delayed without having huge yield losses. Paying bribes to have water in time is 
regarded as calculated profitable costs. In those cases the canal is filled for only one 
producer, even if the formal rule exists, as described above, that several orders from 
appropriators have to be collected before the barrage is opened.  
 
Many opportunities for corruption are offered by the fact that the water price is calcu-
lated and collected. For example, the association adds two Lewa “XMT tax” to the wa-
ter price per each irrigation run. The only information source about this tax is the water 
price information sheet, a little sheet of paper glued at the door of the post office. This 
sheet shows the water price for the season. It explains that this tax is added to each irri-
gation unit. Many different speculations exist among the villagers what this tax is about. 
In addition, villagers doubt that this price is fixed for the whole season. They feel high 
planning insecurity. 
 
A second opportunity is that the controller can give wrong receipts. The water price for 
one irrigation run per decar paprika may, for instance, be 15 Lewa. A farmer may be 
offered then to pay only ten Lewa but receives a receipt for five Lewa. Additionally 
water users being close to the water controller can pay the water price later, when they 
have cash-flow. 
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5.4 ACTOR GROUP CHARACTERISTICS 
As shown in Figure 3, the actor groups characteristics are one dimension of influence on 
collective action in the irrigation sector. The sub-hypothesis is that experiences from the 
socialist time and the transition process have resulted in specific attitudes towards col-
lective action. 
 
Varbiza village has 560 inhabitants at present; 330 of them beeing pensioners and over 
60 years old. There are only four Gipsy families and no Turkish minority people living 
in the village. The farming structure in Varbiza is as follows: 
• one tenant operating 5000 decars3, 
• one tenant operating 2600 decars, 
• one tenant operating 1000 decars, 
• one co-operative operating 2100 decars, 
• two farmers operating 500-600 decars, 
• seven farmers operating 50-60 decars, 
• eight farmers operating less than 20 decars and 
• other subsistence producers having less than 5 decars of land. 
Disregarding the producers farming less than 20 decars, this structure shows that the 
number of farmers and water users is quite small, that means the number of people actu-
ally interested in establishing a water user association is limited. This is a very interest-
ing fact, which directly calls Olson`s model (1965) back to mind. The most frequent 
quoted part of his book says: “unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless 
there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common 
interest, rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or 
group interests” (Olson, 1965: 2, emphasis in original). Surprisingly, compared to  
Olson`s model, the water users do not corporate although their number is quite small. 
This gives another hint that in this case, other factors influence whether groups will or 
will not voluntarily engage for collective benefits.  
 
                                                 
3 1 decar = 0.1 hectare 
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The following two chapters will analyse two questions from the formal interviews with 
the partly standardised questionnaire in Varbiza. In this context, the interpretation is 
done without giving further information about the selection process of the probationers 
and the characteristics of the probationer group.  
5.4.1 Assessment of Future Outlook 
The questionnaire contains several questions forecasting the future by the interviewees. 
One of those questions is exemplary analysed: how do you evaluate the future of your 
farm in the next ten years? Will your children continue in agricultural production on 
your land? The answers from 21 prabationers can be clustered as follows: 
• no descendant will continue farming ! 14 answers (67 %) 
(Children have different interests, they do not want to work in agriculture; they live 
in the city and have other jobs; they have different ideas.)  
• unsure, if descendants will continue farming ! two answers (9.5 %) 
• young families want to continue farming ! four answers (19 %) 
• descendants want to expand the agricultural production ! one answer (4.8 %) 
According to Ostrom (1990: 211) the likelihood of common pool resource appropriators 
adopting a series of incremental changes in operational rule to improve joint welfare 
will be positively related to internal characteristics of the group. Exactly those incre-
mental changes in operational rules are needed when establishing water user associa-
tions based on collective action. One characteristic mentioned is that most appropriators 
highly appreciate the continuous usage of this common pool resource. In other words, 
their discount rates should be low. This actor groups characteristic is examined, among 
others, by the question presented above. People not expecting their descendants to con-
tinue farming on their land have little motivation to invest time and money in the estab-
lishment of collective action solutions or another more sustainable resource 
management.  
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5.4.2  Assessment of Collective Action 
Another characteristic of the actor group fostering collective action solutions explained 
by Ostrom (1990: 211) is that most appropriators must share generalised norms of recip-
rocity and trust that can be used as initial social capital. Likewise, the World Bank 
(World Bank 2000: 87-88) calls for the development of social cohesion in South and 
Eastern Europe. They admit that this requires values imbedded and taught of the socie-
ties which make social cohesion and regional collaboration a desirable behaviour. Poli-
cies which enforce mutual collaboration and interaction are required. Drawing on this 
thoughts, a group of questions evaluating the actors` attitude towards collective action 
was developed.  
 
One, on purpose, provocative question from this question`s group is: if you hear the 
word “collective action”, do you spontaneously have positive or negative feelings4? 
Why? This open question was asked to 22 prabationers in Varbiza. Analysing the an-
swers, the result can be shortly summarised: 15 actors (68 %) gave negative answers, 
four (18 %) did not understand the question, and only three (14 %) gave positive an-
swers related to trust and collective action. Some recurrent arguments of probationers 
are given in extracts. 
• Bulgarians have at the moment no mentality to do something jointly; Bulgarians are 
at the moment not grown for joining; the collaboration period is over for the 
Bulgarians.  
• Irrigation is in the responsibility of the State; the State should take care of this. 
• People cannot do something like this; they are too old; too many old widows. 
• I want to work 100 % individually; I am sick of co-operatives and collective work-
ing; I want to be responsible only for myself; at the moment it is better to work 
alone; I am not interested in what other people do, I care for how my own things are 
running; everybody is working for his own profit in the village. 
• too many free riders; all villagers are very envious; there is no trust among the peo-
ple; you can trust nobody; people behave to each other like animals; there is no trust 
                                                 
4 The word collective action was here explained from the translator. 
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in collaboration; people have been lied to from all sides for the last ten years; collec-
tive leaders only want to gain profit and enrich themselves.  
• positive, if professional could co-operate; they could enforce their interests better; 
those who collaborate believe in the future; with trustful and serious initiators I 
would join. 
5.4.3 Proverbs in Varbiza 
In informal interviews, the following proverbs well-known in the village could be iden-
tified. The existence of proverbs is a good indicator of how people think and of cogni-
tive patterns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical results from Varbiza village in this paper confirm the hypothesis that 
there exist transformation-typical features constraining the process of finding collective 
action solutions for common pool resource management. The analysis will continue in 
this direction.  
 
Most of the people living in Varbiza are too old and are no more active in agricultural 
production, not regarding the subsistence producers having less than 20 decars. Only a 
few young families want to live on agriculture and they have to rely on irrigation for 
their production. Therefore, only a small actors group is concerned when discussing 
changes in operational irrigation rules towards collective action. The attitude towards 
collective action is very pessimistic and there seems to be no trust among the villagers. 
Moreover, individualistic behaviour prevail. Another fact is that information asymmetry 
discriminates most of the actors in decision making. For this variety of reasons the ini-
Neither God is with us nor is the King! 
No dog will ever join a pack for action! 
If three people are given a 50 Lewa note, at least one will say my note is dirtier! 
I can stand being not well off, unless my neighbour is not better off than me! 
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tial social capital fostering collective action solution is restrained. The combination of 
transformation-typical and resource-typical features provides a good ground where op-
portunistic behaviour can grow. Especially the actors characteristics and the information 
asymmetry paves the way for opportunistic behaviour. Another transformation-typical 
feature are chaotic water appropriation rules. They are deliberately misused from a few 
powerful people for profit making. The appearance of non-sustainable associations, 
founded often by outsiders, is the consequence. Those specious associations do not have 
the aim to enforce rules which would minimise the high uncertainty of irrigation in ag-
ricultural production. Those water user associations will come and go in the future, but 
the crucial point is that they destroy the trust of local people in this kind of institutional 
arrangement to deal with common pool resources. People are confirmed in their indi-
vidualistic behaviour. 
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